Yameng Liu, "Justifying My Position in Your Terms"

Liu, Yameng. "Justifying My Position in Your Terms: Cross-cultural Argumentation in a Globalized World." Argumentation 13 (1999): 297-315.

Liu, though he does not cite Starosta, takes the latter's ideas about the intercultural rhetor in quite a different direction. Liu argues that one issue that argumentation and communication scholars have not really faced is intercultural debate. The reason for this failure is the dominant notion of incommensurability between cultures that discourages people from thinking of intercultural disputation in any way that involves "shared interests and reasons" (300). Quoting Beer and Hariman, Liu notes that

As a result, within the dominant framework of international relations, the "complexities of political life are reduced to a calculus of power, justice is reduced to self-interest, appearances are reduced to the reality they conceal, and, ultimately, language is reduced to the world it would represent" (Beer and Hariman, 1996, p. 390). (Liu 299)

An example that both confirms the above and pushes against the inevitability of viewing international relations in this framework involves the use of Western terms of discourse, by non-Western political figures like Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, to debate values with the West. Liu notes that the use of Western discourse styles (dealing with issues like definition and contextualization of the terms of the debate) ends up being rejected--even dismissed--by some in the West (particularly the Western media) as a way for the non-Western leader to avoid changing his authoritarian ways. On the one hand, this confirms the idea that to the West, "appearances are reduced to the reality they conceal"; on the other, it suggests that it is not impossible for non-Westerners to use Western discourse to attempt to engage the West in discussion about fundamental values.

Liu also observes that some in the West have been trying to discuss with non-Western leaders topics such as democracy and human rights by resorting to the non-Westerners' own discursive frameworks. Liu quotes Daniel A. Bell, "a political philosopher with extensive teaching experiences in Singapore and Hong Kong," who argues that "if the 'ultimate aim of human rights diplomacy' is 'to persuade others of the value' of the rights, it is more 'likely that the struggle ... can be won' only if 'it is fought in ways that build on, rather than challenge, local cultural traditions'" (qtd in Liu 307).

Liu continues:

Juxtapose these two symmetrically reversed approaches, and a peculiar mode of cross-cultural argumentation emerges. Rather than trying in vain to meet in a neutral "battleground" for a direct argumentative confrontation before a common audience, the two opposing parties in this paradigm would each venture into the other's "territory" and seek to win the "battle" by provoking a "civil war" behind the opponent's line. (309)

That is, each side would use the other side's internal conflicts regarding values to instigate debate among members of the other culture regarding the two sides' positions. Liu calls this mode of argumentation "cross-arguing" (309).

He admits that cross-arguing is not without problems: issues such as how "cross-arguers" should argue their points in another culture:

consistently applying the cross-arguer's domestic norms would amount to exercising a kind of rhetorical extraterritoriality that is bound to antagonize the targeted audience and doom the persuasive efforts, whereas to switch codes according to what terms are being invoked is to risk losing one's identity and appearing inconsistent or even unethical by the standard of one's own community. (310).

This is no small problem; neither is another problem that Liu mentions: what happens to a position if the audience does not accept it. Liu doubts the position would be rejected by the domestic audience even if the targeted audience doesn't accept it. The question then becomes, then what should be done? Liu concludes,

One possible way out of this predicament may be to focus on what defines cross-arguing as a unique mode of argumentation, namely, the symmetrical mutuality of its operation. This essential feature decides that cros-cultural argumentation, to be at all possible, should always be a "bi-active" practice, and a clear-cut division of labor between an active persuader ... and a reactive/passive persuadee ... that serves to well in structuring intra-cultural argumentation does not apply in its organization. ... Since in cross-arguing, each party "intrudes" into the other's terministic "territory" and defends its own against the other's "counter-intrusion" at the same time, both play the same double role as a protagonist/antagonist and should bear the same burden of justification. (311-12)

The "bi-active" nature of Liu's description can undercut the problems that Starosta sees in intercultural rhetoric, where an active intercultural rhetor imposes his/her views on a more-or-less passive "native" audience.

[cross-arguing] [intercultural communication] [rhetoric] [Yameng Liu]